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Introduction. Kevin Scharp is Reader in Philosophy and Director of
Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews.
Kevin has developed a conceptual engineering approach to the liar
paradox, according to which the concept of truth is intrinsically de-
fective and needs to be replacedwith other concepts, when doing se-
mantics. This method can be applied across philosophy, giving rise
to a new methodology and a new way of thinking about philosophi-
cal problems. Kevin is also interested in the semantics for normative
concepts. He and BryanWeaver are going to publish a book titled Se-
mantics for Reasons at Oxford University Press in 2019.
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Thanks for having us.
Thanks for inviting me.
I have a first question about what is philosophy for you. At the very beginning
of yourbookReplacingTruth you say that you seephilosophy, basically, as the
study of inconsistent concepts. What do youmean by that?
Ok, so, I think that some of our concepts are defective in the sense that they can
beusedproperly, but evenwhenusedproperly they can lead someone to believe
a contradiction or pursue contradictory plans, and be irrational. So, it is not that
someone is misusing or misapplying the concept, for the person is using them
properly, but is the concept itself that is defective. And so, I think that this way
of thinking about concepts is very plausible in the case of standard philosoph-
ical concepts: the concepts that philosophers have been investigating for the
last 2000 years. I think that is the case with respect to Truth, but also Goodness,
Beauty, Value, Freedom, Knowledge etc. So, I think it makes sense to say that all
of these standard philosophical concepts are defective, or inconsistent, and that
this goes someway to explain why philosophical disputes are so intractable, and
why they make such slow progress, and why philosophy is not like the sciences,
at least the hard sciences.
Ok, and do you think that science is basically old philosophy? That when a
concept becomes tractable it goes into the sciences?
It does not always happens, but yes, frequently it does. Though, sometimes it
just gets kicked out completely. For example, alchemy was part of philosophy
and all these various alchemical concepts were part of philosophy, and then
most of them got kicked out. It is not that they became a science, but even-
tually a different science started, chemistry. And when the concepts of oxygen
etc. got “cleaned up” from their alchemical background, and when those were
sufficiently clean and in good shape, then they could be spun off as a science
and they were no longer part of philosophy. I think you can see the sequence of
sciences, you know, being immitted by philosophy over the last 400 years.
Aquestion onBrandom. You did your PhD inPittsburgh, Brandomwas there.
You said that he, more than everyone, has had an impact on your work. So
can you tell us more about how he helped shape your current philosophical
views?
I first encountered Brandom when I was a graduate student in Northwestern.
So, I first started my PhD at Northwestern. I took a couple of seminars on Bran-
dom’s work. And I became really obsessed with his bookMaking it explicit and
I felt like this was a really different and intesting way of thinking about standard
philosophical issues and problems. He was drawing this very big picture: big
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sweeping claims about the history of philosophy and how parts of philosophy
interact with one another and about how whole vocabolaries relate to one an-
other. And that really struck me as well: I like big pictures, and I think he was
underepresented in philosophy and I though he was doing really well. So, then
the people I wanted to work with at Northwestern left and so I got lucky and got
accepted at Pittsburgh as a transfer student. And the paper that I wrote for my
application was a criticism of Brandom. And he ended up liking it and I was in,
and Iwas able toworkwith him, andhewas the supervisor formyPhD. Thatwas
sort of a dreamcome true. I had nevermet himbefore, so being able to have him
as a mentor was spectacular.
Is Brandom’s pragmatism related to your conceptual engineering ideas?
I think so. He actually uses the term "conceptual engineering" in a paper from
2001, andThepaper is a transcript of a talk he gave in 1999, and around the same
time Blackburn uses the term in his book Think. But both of them when they
use the term"conceptual engineering" theywere just throwing remarks, they are
both describingwhat do andwhat I care about, but they are not doing it in a kind
of detailed way. I mean, the word occurs only once in each piece. But yes, the
wayBrandomthinks of concepts: the idea that even though surelywehave a grip
on concepts, in the way we "possess them", concepts also “have a grip on us”,
they “do things” to us, too. They almost have a sort of life of their own, to some
extent. They are not these pure 100% accurate gems handed down from heaven
or something like that. They are messy, and made up by humans over 1000 of
years sometimes. It would be ridicoulus to expect them being anything other
than a mess. And that is a big aspect of Brandom’s work that had an influence
onme.
Another aspect is that he enphasises that a theory ofmeaning should be "ex-
pressively complete", whichmeans that it should be able to give themeaning of
its own sentences, the sentences thatmake up the theory. So, for example, a ver-
ificationist theory ofmeaning, the one the positivists had, says that themeaning
of some term is itsmethod of verification. Yet this claim itself cannot be verified.
This was one of the problems critics where pointing out: it looks like the posi-
tivists theory ofmeaning is self-undermining. And soBrandommade an explicit
constrain on his theory ofmeaning so that it should not have this feature, so that
it should not be self-undermining like that.
So, when I started thinking about truth, I saw the same kind of problem: lots
of theories of truth do not apply to the language in which they are formulated.
And so forme I think seeing Brandomhaving that kind of constrain on his views
onmeaningmade a bit easier forme to insist on something like that in the realm
of truth, while everyone else on truth was saying: "That is wrong, that’s a mis-
take". There’s a couple of other people, Vann McGee I think is a great example
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of one other person out there insisting on this sort of constrain. When I started
taking this constrain seriously, a lot of my ideas on truth kind of fell into place.
Thanks for bringing this out, since I wanted to talk about your book on Truth.
So, the stuff you just said is related to revengeparadoxes. People usually come
up with a solution to the Liar paradox, but somehow what they say about the
paradox can get turned around andmade into a new paradox that the theory
can’t handle. And so, you insist that this is a serious issue, it’s not just a "puz-
zling thing". Sinceno conceptual analysis can solve this, soweneed to replace
the concept itself, at least in logical frameworks: in everyday life we can just
get way with using the old inconsistent concept.
Exactly. There are a couple of more steps there. The concept is defective, yet it is
useful. The defect is a problem for someof its uses. In particular, doing a seman-
tics for a particularly rich language, like natural language. And so, in a situation
like that, when you have an inconsistent concept that is preventing you from
doing what you want to do with it, then it makes sense to replace it with one or
more other concepts that do that job without having that defect. So, these are
the boxes that you have to check in order to get to the replacement.
Gotcha. So,we cangoa little deeper into this. Letme summarizebriefly the is-
sue and your solution. In standard semanticswewant the so called T-schema:
P if and only if P is true, for every sentence P. Yet, having this schema unre-
strictedly gives rise to the liar paradox: there is a sentence that says of itself
that it is not true. So, if it is true, it is not true, and if it is not true it is true.
To avoid this, you say, we should replace Truth with two other concepts: As-
cending and Descending Truth. With either of these concepts, you don’t have
the full T-schema. One satisfies only the left to right part of the T-schema, the
other only the right to left. How can we be sure that the job that Truth does
can be done with these concepts?
That is a difficult thing to show. I focus only on this one job of doing semantics,
and on attributing truth-conditions to the sentences in question. If you want
a theory that attributes truth-conditions then it’s going to run into a liar para-
dox problem. The kind of theory that I propose does not offer truth-conditions
to sentences, but instead it offers ascending truth-conditions and decending
truth-conditions, using ascending and descending truth, respectively. And so
then, the question is: "Great, whywould I want these ascending and descending
truth-conditions? How is that even doing semantics?" Well, in almost all cases,
the ascending and descending truth-conditions are the same: they are just the
truth-conditions. Thereareonlydifferenceswhen it comes to things like liar sen-
tences, and only then they differ, and that is the key to avoiding the paradox. So
in what sense is the theory that I offer really doing what we want to do, but bet-
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ter? The sense is that it reduces to the truth-conditional theory in all the normal
circumstances, it changes only in the circumstances that the truth-conditional
theory simply can’t handle, at all.
What about the idea that some people have, that paraconsistent logic is the
answer. They say: "Yeah, that is a paradox, and that’s it", you have to learn to
live with the fact that something is both true and not true. How do you argue
with that?
Yes, the price there is that you end up with a very weak logic as a result, and a
very counterintuitive one, as well. One where usually modus ponens fails, if, for
example, we are in Priest’s Logic of paradox. I mean, you can go paraconsistent
without that, right? You can have BX, which is a relevant logic, which is what
Beall endorses. So you don’t have to have that counterintuitive consequence of
no modus ponens, but you still have others. Whenever you go paraconsistent,
you are gonna have extremely counterintuitive consequences.
And this is themain problem you have with paraconsistent approaches.
I think there is a number of problems here, and I want to emphasize the fact that
the dialethic paraconsistent view on paradoxes has a lot going for it. It’s not just
a crazy view. I lived through a time in my graduate school when people thought
it was just crazy. And that was the standard objection, and people laughed and
poke fun about it. Thankfully those days are over. At least for philosophy of lan-
guage and logic people don’t act like that anymore and that’s good. It is sort of
difficult to come upwith decent objections when people just have this standard
just-gut reaction: "This is gonna bewrong". My ownway of thinking about what
is wrong with the dialethic paraconsistent view is the following. There’s lots of
concepts and vocaboulary that we have in natural language that paraconsistent
logician has trouble dealing with and the standard example is "just true". So, if I
wanna call something "just true", what I mean is that it’s not false, it is just true.
How do I do that in a paraconsistent view? It is a standard problem. Priest has a
solution to this, which I think it does not work. And J. C. Beall recently put out
his “shrieking approach” to just true and that generated a decent bit of attention.
I just put out a criticism of his shrieking approach. First, here is what the shriek-
ing approach consists in. If you take the shrieking line, everytime I am calling
something "just true" what I am calling "just true" is actually a bit different than
what I think it is, and I am just calling that thing just true. Suppose you want
to say that a theory T is just true. Now J. C. Beall comes along and says: "Here s
what you really said. You really said that this other thing, not T but T-shrieked is
true, where in the shrieked theory you added a consistency assumption.
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You add a bunch of rules to the thing, and you change the theory.
Exactly. Now suppose we are having a conversation about something and I say:
"Hey, guess what! T is both true and false". And you say: "No, it s not! it’s just
true!" Now, according to the shrieking approach you are not talking about T, you
are talking about something else.
It’s a change of subject.
Yes, exactly. we are not even talking about the same thing anymore. That seems
bad. It gets worse than that: the approach is part of the bigger project by para-
consistent logicians to understand what happens in situations in which we are
assuming to be consistent. And you cannot just add a consistency assumption
and “get back” classical reasoning in paraconsistent systems.
This is actually a big asymmetry between paracomplete theories like Field’s
andparaconsistent theories like Priest’s andBeall’s. Aparacomplete logician can
get classical reasoning back by assuming excluded middle. It works pretty well
compare to the paraconsistent theorist. For, if you just assume consistency, that
is perfectly consistent with paraconsistency for the paraconsistent theorist. So,
it does not solve anything at all. Here you have a big asymmetry, there.
One of the other problems I point out is that, in the shrieking approach, we
must assume that there are shrieking operators all over language, hidden inside
every sentence.
Yes, youwouldhave tochange the logical structureof sentences, andthatwould
imply some big semantic blindness of the speakers.
Yes, exactly, it would imply a massive semantic blindness.
What do you think in general about paraconsistent dialetheist approaches?
Well, in general paraconsistent dialetheist and conceptual engineers agree on a
lot of stuff. We both think that something like the analytic principles for truth
are inconsistent. Yet the dialetheist says: they are analytic so they must be true
but they imply their falsity so they are also false, so they are both true and false.
What I say, on the other hand, is that they are meaning-constitutive but that
does notmean they are true: they are just false. In this way I can go in a different
direction, by not abandoning classical logic. I am rather after a consistent theory
of inconsistent concepts.
Themethodyousuggesthas tonsof ramifications. If youare right about truth,
itmightbe thata lotof thephilosophicaldiscussionrightnowmightbemethod-
ologically faulty, andwemight rather try toreviseour terminology inourphilo-
sophical discussion.
Yes. Firstly, the question is: how do you think about the pile of paradoxes that
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show up around philosophy about different concepts? I am thinking about the
paradox of Free will and Determinism, or the paradoxes of Knowledge, or of
Goodness, or ofNaturalness inmetaphysics. Does that show that these concepts
are defective? If so, you have to think about the use of these concepts. What do
you want to do with them? And how might these defects get in the way, and if
they do get in the way how do you replace these concepts with another team
of concepts that do not have those defects to begin with. I think that in each
of these cases the answers are different, because the uses of these concepts are
different. So, there is no across-the-board recipe that works in every case. You
really have to think through the details of each particular case and then make
some suggestions on how to replace these concepts with others that are tailored
to that particular case.
Now, let’s say that youhave replaced truthwith two concepts, and knowledge
and Goodness with some bunch of concepts. Now instead of three concepts we
have, say, fifteen concepts. How three or four concepts interactwith one another
is quite a complicated issue but not crazy complicated, right? How fifteen con-
cepts interact with one another: that’s way more complicated. So, the number
of decisions you have to make in thinking through how these replacement con-
cepts interact with one another goes up as you replace one concept with two or
three. So, that is one kind of a headache for my kind of a method. Yet, in some
sense it is a good thing because it makes the project more rich and interesting.
It is an additional step in the project that other philosophical methodologies do
not have, at all. So, what I am thinking about now is how to extend this method-
ology across philosophy and thinking of philosophy as the study of what turned
out to be defective concepts. If that’s the case quite often, then how should our
methodology be like? I think conceptual engineering in such cases is the right
answer. But it needs a lot of detail: it turns out quite difficult to say much in
general about how to do conceptual engineering, without looking at particular
cases.
Is conceptual engineering what youmainly focus on in your work on deontic
modals, as well? I know that you are going to publish a book titled Semantics
for Reasons with BryanWeaver in a fewmonths.
So, my angle on Ought is somewhat different. It comes from thinking about rea-
sons. There are a lot of people that want to say that Ought and Reasons are con-
nected in important ways. So, if you have good reasons to do something, then
that’s what you ought to do, and what you ought to is what you have most rea-
sons to. That’s the basic idea. Now, the work on Ought in the literature is re-
ally interesting because it’s been kind of “invaded” by philosopher of language
and linguists and people doing natural language semantics. There is a tremen-
dous amount of smart people thinking hard about how to understand the se-
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mantics for ‘Ought’ statements. And what are the philosophical consequences
of that? I think they are huge and they spread all across meta-ethics, moral psy-
chology, normative ethics etc. But there has been not, at least since a couple
of years ago, a semantics about reasons, at all. So, this is what the book I co-
authoredwith BryanWeaver is about: a semantics for reasons. Now, I don’t think
that one’s approach for the semantics for reasons dictates one’s approach for
the semantics for Ought. I am kind of partial to the Kratzer style semantics for
Ought1 even though it does not always play super-nicely for the semantics for
reasons-claims me and Weaver ultimately endorse. Two main things to think
about when it comes to the semantics for reasons and that kind of lessons you
might want to draw from other areas are these. Firstly, in the literature on rea-
sons in meta-ethics there is a vast number of distinctions: internal-external,
normative-motivating, and million others. Now, how are those distinctions re-
lated to one another? No one knows, right? And how are they related to the
meaning of the word “Reasons”? Are these distinctions disambiguations? So,
are they different meanings of the word “Reason”? Or are they rather different
assumptions on what reasons are and they presuppose the same meaning for
“Reasons”? How do they work?
So, one of the big things with our semantics theory is that we lay out six or
sevenmajordistinctionspeople appeal to in the literature andweexplaineachof
those andhoware they related to one another in termof their semantics. And so,
you can see exactly how they are related to one another and you can see which
are semantic distinctions and which are not semantic distinctions. We give a
nice sort of method for distinguishing those in a simple way, with a simple lin-
guistic test.
So, basically, the book would help the discussion between different sort of
people, am I right? Like the psychologists and the linguists and the philoso-
phers.
Yeah, that’s the idea. The main focus of the whole project though is getting to a
philosophical payoff. The idea is: now that we see what the semantics for rea-
son is, we can think about whether the ontology of reasons are any good. We
can think about whether the discussion between reasons and rationality are any
good. And we can also judge the debate about moral reasons and other kind
of reasons, as well. One of the main things that we do is use the semantics to
develop a “reasons first” approach in general, where all normative phenomena
can be explained in a certain sense in terms of reasons. But it’s not the case that
reasons can be explained in terms of other normative phenomena. So, reasons
1A Kratzer style semantics is a Neighbourhood semantics for modal logic: it can handle modal
logics where K ((P→ Q)→ ( P→  Q)) or Necessitation (if P is a theorem then  P is a theorem)
fail.
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are fist in the normative realm. This is one of themain philosophical stance you
can defend using this semantics.
That all sounds really interesting. Thanks for the good chat and for your time.
Cool great! Thanks so much!
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